By: Andrew Regitsky
Stopping illegal robocalls that originate abroad remains a particular problem for the Commission because of the difficulty in reaching foreign-based robocallers and the foreign voice service providers that originate their traffic. Companies are reporting that foreign robocalls are a significant percentage if not the majority of illegal robocalls:
The latest data from the Industry Traceback Group supports the conclusion that many providers facilitating illegal robocalls are gateway providers and the upstream foreign originating and intermediate providers from whom they receive foreign-originating calls. Of the 347 providers identified in the Industry Traceback Group’s 2021 report as responsible for transmitting illegal robocalls, 111 were gateway providers that brought the traffic into the U.S. network, and 115 were foreign providers originating illegal robocalls. According to the Industry Traceback Group, 10% of all providers that are not responsive to traceback requests constitute 48% of all non-responsive traceback requests. Of that 10%, over two-thirds are foreign providers. (Docket 17-97, Draft Sixth Report and Order, at para. 23).
The FCC keeps trying to stop these calls. In a bevy of April 28, 2022, draft releases to be voted on at its May meeting, the agency released a Gateway Provider Report and Order (Gateway Provider Order), in Docket 17-59 and an Order on Reconsideration, Order, and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Further Notice) in Docket 17-97 to address the issue of illegal foreign robocalls from several angles.
The Gateway Provider Order mandates the following:
Require gateway providers to submit a certification and mitigation plan to the Robocall Mitigation Database describing their robocall mitigation practices and certifying that they are adhering to those practices.
Require gateway providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN to authenticate unauthenticated Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) calls that are carrying a U.S. number in the caller ID field.
Adopt several robocall mitigation requirements for gateway providers, including a 24-hour traceback request response requirement, mandatory blocking requirements, “know your upstream provider” requirement, and general mitigation standard.
The Order on Reconsideration:
Requires domestic providers to accept calls carrying U.S. NANP numbers only from foreign originating and intermediate providers registered in the Robocall Mitigation Database and resolve petitions for reconsideration and end the stay of enforcement of the rule.
The Further Notice Would:
Propose and seek comment on several further steps the Commission can take to combat illegal robocalls, including extending requirements for authentication and filing in the Robocall Mitigation Database, enhancing the affirmative obligations of providers to stop illegal calls, requiring additional measures for robocall mitigation, enhancing enforcement mechanisms, and other related issues aimed at closing existing potential loopholes.
The Commission seeks industry comments on further steps it could take in its battle against illegal robocalls. Specifically, it seeks comment on extending some of the new requirements it imposes on gateway providers today to all domestic providers, including expanding the STIR/SHAKEN authentication obligation to all intermediate providers; applying certain existing mitigation obligations, including some adopted in this Order, to a broader range of providers; enhancing the enforcement of its rules; clarifying certain aspects of its STIR/SHAKEN regime; and placing limits on the use of U.S. NANP numbers for foreign-originated calls and indirect number access.
Industry comments will be due 30 days after the Further Notice appears in the Federal Register.